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In the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial and economic crisis, capital flows to
emerging countries surged again. There have
been similar episodes in the past three decades,
including one that culminated in the 1997–98
East Asian financial crisis. The problems that
have emerged in the various episodes are like a
refrain in a song: appreciating currencies that
could lead to exchange rate overshooting,
pressure on asset prices, which can result in
bubbles that amplify financial fragility and crisis
risk, and possibility of overheating, resulting in
inflation.
Policy responses are also well established, divided
into macroeconomic measures and prudential
regulations. Each policy measure involves trade-
offs. In order to avoid these trade-offs, capital
controls can instead be imposed. The issue then
becomes whether capital controls are effective
or not. There has also been discussion and
debate on the conditions under which capital
controls will be effective.
What differs in each episode of surges in capital
flows are the circumstances facing a particular
economy. What would be similar is that
policymakers in each country would consider
capital controls. This is a normal reaction given
that macroeconomic measures and prudential
regulations have limitations or involve trade-
offs. Another common thread in the past is the
opposition of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to capital controls.
During the most recent surge, however, the IMF
has for the first time openly supported the use
of capital controls, albeit under strict
conditions.1 More surprisingly, emerging market
economies disagreed with the IMF advice,
arguing that the proposed framework reduces
their flexibility. This was expressed in a joint
______________
1 Ostry et al. (2010), Ostry et al. (2011), IMF Strategy,
Policy and Review Department.PN 2011-12
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communiqué of the Ministers of the
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four
addressed to the Development Committee of the
IMF, viz:2
“Ministers did not agree with the
proposed framework for staff advice to
member countries on managing capital
flows and its inclusion in Fund
surveillance. Policymakers of countries
facing large and volatile capital flows
must have the flexibility and discretion
to adopt policies that they consider
appropriate and effective to mitigate
risks through macroeconomic policies,
prudential measures and capital
controls, as stipulated in the Articles of
Agreement.”
Moreover, the G24 also disagreed with the IMF
assessment that “the onus of policy adjustment
from inflow surges rests solely on the recipient
countries.” The G24 stated that the IMF must
“take into account policies in capital-originating
countries, especially systemically important
financial centers, as well as specific circumstances
of capital-receiving countries.”
In this Policy Notes, the risks that emanate from
the recent surge in capital flows are outlined
and discussed in some detail. This is followed by
a presentation of the IMF proposed framework
on how to respond to surges in capital inflows.
The various responses and the trade-offs and
limitations are presented in summary form. The
Philippine case is described with reference to
possible reasons for the reaction of the G24.




Capital flows into emerging market economies
are driven by both “push” and “pull” factors. The
latter consist of favorable developments in the
emerging market economies that attract capital.
Meanwhile, “push” factors refer to elements
outside the control of emerging markets such as
the decline in international interest rates and
economic recessions in industrialized countries.
The recent surge in capital flows has obviously
been driven by “push” factors.
Large capital flows, if not managed properly, can
expose the emerging markets to at least three
types of risks. The first is macroeconomic risk.
Capital inflows could accelerate the growth of
domestic credit, create economic overheating
including inflation, and cause the real exchange
rate to appreciate, thus affecting macroeconomic
performance in a way not consistent or
compatible with domestic policy objectives such
as sustainable economic growth with price
stability. The second is risk of financial
instability. Capital flows could create maturity
and currency mismatches in the balance sheets
of private sector debtors (particularly banks and
corporations), push up equity and asset prices,
and potentially reduce the quality of assets,
thereby contributing to greater financial
fragility. The third is risk of capital flow reversal.
Capital inflows could stop suddenly or even
reverse themselves within a short period,
resulting in depleted reserves or sharp currency
depreciation.3
______________
2 Downloaded from http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/
2011/041411.htm.




Because of these risks, policymakers in emerging
market economies are advised to respond to
surges in capital flows. The proposed IMF
framework is shown in Figure 1. A useful summary
of these measures, including the possible trade-
offs, is shown in Table 1. More details can be
found in Kawai and Lamberte (2010).
The Philippine case
Capital has also flowed into the Philippine
economy as shown in Table 2. The ‘Capital and
Financial Account’ shows the net aggregate
capital flows to the country. Surges are usually
monitored through portfolio investment which is
what is considered as ‘hot money’. Based on this
Figure 1. Coping with surges in capital inflows: macroeconomic and prudential
considerations1
1 From the perspective of an individual country without taking account of multilateral considerations; on the effectiveness of controls.PN 2011-12
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Policy Tools Intended Outcome Possible Limitations Evidence on Recommended Policy
Effectiveness Responses
Sterilized intervention Prevent nominal and Rising quasi-fiscal cost; Some evidence of Limit the use of sterilized
real appreciation while higher interest rates that effectiveness in the intervention as a short-run
neutralizing the growth attract additional inflows; short term, but not measure; reduce international
of base money unable to prevent real in the medium to reserves through a reserve-
appreciation over the long term sharing arrangement (like a
medium term due to multilateralized Chiang Mai
eventual inflation Initiative)
Greater exchange rate Direct monetary policy Loss of international Limited evidence on Allow greater flexibility through
flexibility for macroeconomic price competitiveness the response of regional cooperation (see the
management; discourage speculative flows discussion of regional collective
speculative capital inflows action)
by creating two-way risks
Fiscal policy tightening Contain inflationary Lack of flexibility and Some evidence of Exploit the automatic stabilizer
pressure; discourage timeliness; a natural limit to effectiveness in function of the budget; that is, the
capital inflows by reducing the degree of tightening; preventing real government may implement
interest rate pressure; reduction of the provision of appreciation and planned infrastructure investment
prevent real appreciation some basic services and keeping better and basic services delivery
infrastructure investment; growth performance without increasing spending out
possibility of a positive following capital of higher tax revenues or
signaling effect to attract flow reversals reducing tax rates
additional inflows
Financial sector reform Minimize the negative Not achievable in the short n.a. Strengthen financial sector
impact of capital flow run supervision and regulation;
reversals by promoting develop and deepen capital
risk management markets
Controls on capital Limit capital inflows High administrative capacity Some evidence of For financially open economies,
inflows required, which is lacking in effectiveness in carefully design selective,
many emerging market lengthening the temporary, market-based controls
economies maturity of inflows and avoid a system of extensive
without much impact administrative controls. For
on the volume; financially closed economies,
effectiveness tends pursue capital account
to weaken over time liberalization in a well-sequenced
way together with institutional
development
Easing restrictions on Reduce net inflows by Insufficient pent-up demand Some evidence of Ease outflow controls together
capital outflows encouraging outflows; for foreign assets; possibility promoting additional with complementary measures
allow residents to diversify of a positive signaling effect capital inflows such as strengthening financial
risks to attract additional inflows sector supervision
Rebalancing growth Reduce current account Policymakers’ reluctance to n.a. For former-crisis economies,
surpluses by refocusing abandon existing policies stimulate infrastructure
sources of growth from investment. For PRC, reduce
external to domestic corporate and household savings
demand; contain upward and redirect investment toward
pressure on the real social sector protection
exchange rate












































Policy Tools Intended Outcome Possible Limitations Evidence on Recommended Policy
Effectiveness Responses
Further trade Reduce current account Failure of net imports to n.a. Sustain ongoing efforts to
liberalization surpluses by encouraging rise when the tradables liberalize trade
imports; contain upward sector becomes more
pressure on the real competitive as a result;
exchange rate possibility of a positive
signaling effect to attract
additional inflows
Greater Minimize the volatility of Lack of sufficient attention Occurrence of Support ongoing international
transparency capital flows by to fundamentals by market crises despite the transparency initiatives
strengthening the role of participants rise in transparency
fundamentals
Countercyclicality Minimize herd behavior Unlikely to receive wide n.a. Consider this measure as part of
in financial resulting from imperfect support the agenda for future research
regulation and asymmetric information
Regional exchange Maintain macroeconomic Not viable without a n.a. Utilize existing policy dialogue
rate coordination and financial sector stability mechanism for conducting processes such as ASEAN+3
without much affecting intensive policy dialogue ERPD and EMEAP to achieve
international price and cooperation collective currency appreciation
competitiveness
Regional financial Monitor regional financial Not viable without an n.a. Establish a new, high-level "Asian
market surveillance/ markets and capital flows; effective institution Financial Stability Dialogue" on
integration mitigate the impact of regional financial sector issues
investor herd behavior
and financial contagion
Regional Enhance capacity of Not viable without an n.a. Include this measure among
cooperation financial regulators and effective institution important functions of the "Asian
on capacity supervisors to manage Financial Stability Dialogue"






















































Source: Kawai and Lamberte (2010), Table 1.9, pp. 35–38
Table 2. Current transfers and net capital flows in the Philippines (in million USD)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010p
Current transfers  5,748  5,643  6,860  7,680 8,386  9,160 11,391 13,197 14,153 15,247 16,279 16,595
Current acccount balance -2,875 -2,228 -1,750 -282 285  1,625 1,980 5,341 7,112 3,627 8,788 7,811*
Capital and financial account  4,185  3,363  911  1,056 726 -1,630 2,229 20 3,527  -1,649  -1,627 7,948
Financial account  4,022  3,225  849  1,029 672 -1,647 2,189 -118 3,503  -1,702  -1,731 7,850
Direct investment  1,114  2,115  335  1,477 188  109 1,665 2,818 -620 1,285 1,604 1,226
Portfolio investments  3,315 -553  1,027  746 562 -1,713 3,475 3,043 4,623  -3,627 -625 4,018
Financial derivatives 8 44 -15 -21  -64   -27 -43 -138 -288 -113 32 -191
Other investments -415  1,619 -498 -1,173  -14   -16  -2,908  -5,841 -212  753  -2,742 2,797
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Notes: p – preliminary; * – IMF staff estimatePN 2011-12
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concept, the Philippines experienced a surge in
capital flows in 1999 after the 1997 East Asian
financial crisis; the period 2005–2007, which was
the lead up to the 2008 global financial crisis; and
2010, which is the most recent episode.
What has complicated matters is the heavy
reliance of the economy on remittances from
overseas workers. These are recorded as part of
current transfers. While not strictly a capital
inflow, it nevertheless would have similar
effects. The large inflows of remittances has
resulted in a current account surplus. This
contributes to an increase in foreign exchange
reserves which in turn exerts pressure on the
currency to appreciate.
The impact of capital flows can be seen from the
behavior of stock prices and the exchange rate
(Figure 2). The peso appreciated sharply during
the period 2005–2007. At the same time, there
was a sharp increase in stock prices. Portfolio
inflows were one of the main drivers in both
cases.
Sterilized intervention has been the most common
form of response among emerging markets and the
Philippines is no exception. Narrowly defined,
sterilization involves the exchange of domestic
bonds for foreign assets, often through open
market operations, designed to neutralize the
increase in base money arising from the purchases
of foreign currency. Through sterilized
intervention, countries experiencing surges in
capital inflows can maintain the nominal exchange
rate while also preventing the capital inflow from
increasing the balance of base money.
Sterilized intervention generally involves the
tightening of monetary policy. It can be self-
defeating by raising the level of interest rates
and encouraging further capital inflows.
Moreover, the interest cost of this measure has
to be closely monitored, as sterilization typically
Figure 2. Stock prices and exchange rate in the Philippines (1998–2010)PN 2011-12
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carries quasi-fiscal costs that arise from the
exchange of high-yielding domestic debt for
low-yielding foreign assets.4 It should be noted
that unsterilized intervention is also an option,
i.e., the increase in base money is not
neutralized. However, this will likely lead to
higher inflation.
Data indicate that intervention was heavier in
the Philippines during the period 1998–2007
compared with1987–1997. Sterilization was also
more pronounced in the post-crisis period (Yap
2010). Overall, intervention—usually measured
as the percentage change in the level of
international reserves—has been mildly
successful in reducing the volatility of exchange
rate movements. This is precisely the principle
behind the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
intervention policy: reducing volatilities rather
than swaying the exchange rate in one direction
or changing the path of the exchange rate.
An issue of great interest would be the
consistency of sterilized intervention and
inflation targeting. The objective of sterilized
intervention is to maintain the monetary base at
a certain level. Hence, the target is a monetary
aggregate. Meanwhile, the main instrument in
inflation targeting is the interest rate which is
definitely affected by the process of
sterilization. A conflict may arise in the
objectives of maintaining a monetary aggregate
and achieving an inflation target.
These types of situations make the use of capital
controls more attractive. Capital controls have
proven be effective in several economies (see for
example Epstein et al. 2004). However, with the
advent of greater financial integration, capital
controls, particularly on inflows, have to be
endorsed at the international level in order to be
effective (Grenville 2007). This is one reason
why the recent endorsement by the IMF—albeit
done grudgingly—is a significant development.
Policy recommendations
There are at least two areas in the Philippines
where policy measures can help stem currency
appreciation or reduce overheating caused by
capital inflows without having to resort to
sterilized intervention. The first is through fiscal
restraint and the second is through an increase
in the investment rate.
The fiscal situation in the Philippines showed
marked improvement during the period 2006–
2008. Moreover, the proposal for fiscal restraint to
stem currency appreciation is normally made in
the context of a current account deficit. Hence,
fiscal restraint was not a policy alternative during
the surge in capital flows between 2005 and
2007. However, because of the deterioration in
the fiscal situation in 2009 and 2010, better fiscal
management—particularly in increasing the tax
effort—has become an important tool in
responding to the surge in capital inflows in 2010.
The investment rate in the Philippines—defined
as the ratio of fixed investment to GDP—has
been historically low in the Philippines. It is
also low compared with the more developed
Southeast Asian economies, i.e., Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and even Viet
Nam. A higher investment rate will lead to more
______________
4 Definition of sterilized intervention and discussion of
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imports which will reduce the current account
surplus. Supply side constraints and institutional
factors can explain the low investment rate. The
government has to address these issues and the
private sector has to display more ‘animal
spirits’ in order to raise the investment rate in
the Philippines.
As for capital controls, the IMF has raised
concerns that widespread use of capital controls
by emerging markets will have negative effects
on the efficient allocation of investment across
countries. Widespread use of controls could also
constrain necessary steps to address global
imbalances.
The arguments of the IMF, however, do not take
into account the scenario wherein private
investors can readily punish countries for
imposing capital controls by taking their money
elsewhere. Unilateral action will therefore be
less effective. Capital controls will be a more
effective policy tool if implemented in the
context of regional cooperation.
The issue of capital flows should be analyzed in
a broader context, with policies in industrialized
economies being taken into consideration. In
particular, the role of the US dollar as an
international reserve currency has been
questioned. The major contention is that an
international reserve system that is based on a
national currency is inherently unstable. The
shift to a fiduciary dollar system—wherein there
is no anchor to the dollar unlike during the gold
standard—has only exacerbated the situation. It
has been argued that the “exorbitant privilege”
granted to the US is the major source of the
global macroeconomic imbalances. Policy
recommendations emanating from this analysis
relate to the reform of the international financial
architecture. 
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